I posted about my student’s paper on non-employment margins of adjustment before I’d seen Jeffrey Clemens’ paper on the same topic. In the context of the minimum wage, Clemens’ paper invites us to re-capture the “old learning” when process and property rights thinking formed the core of economists’ approach to understanding markets.
This semester, I am teaching a graduate course on the history of economic thought. In it, I take a slightly different approach to the subject than most such classes. I do not follow any chronological order, I do not assign any full books or classics, nor any textbooks. Not that these alternative approaches do not have their advantages. However, my goal is to show students how economists, mainline and mainstream, have debated specific issues of doctrine that remain crucially important to the professional discourse to this day. Perhaps a bit more unique to my syllabus is the emphasis on topics near and dear to our hearts at CSOC: economic calculation, the division of labor, property rights, and transaction costs. Bonus: No macro! 😉
When we remember the many margins on which competition occurs, we’re inclined to think of competition as a “tough weed,” rather than a “delicate flower.” In addition to taking on highly sophisticated economic thinkers like Philippon, Louis’ review should also be seen as a provocative challenge to the rising Neo-Brandeisians.
Almost entirely missing from the empirical minimum wage debates are the other “margins of adjustment” that are available to market participants. And when it comes to labor markets, that means adjustments to the contractual terms of employment.
Unfortunately, focus on these “margins” has ben a casualty of the “MIT approach” to economics, with its laser-like focus on “p’s” and “q’s” to the exclusion of all else. Then there’s the fact that these margins aren’t easily measured. After all, the possibilities for adjustment are limited only by entrepreneurial imagination. Gordon Tullock, for instance, pointed out that employers might respond to the minimum wage by turning off the air conditioner on a sultry day.
A recent paper by my student, Jack Everett, reminds us of the myriad margins of adjustment available to employers. If the empirical analysis doesn’t show disemploying effects of the minimum wage, that just means it’s time to roll up our sleeves and dive into the rich, multi-faceted nature of economic life.
The Revue d’Économie Politique is running a special issue on the economics of conflict. In my contribution I develop and apply a basic framework to study the evolution of a ruler-principal’s choice of how to compensate their warring-agents.
Here’s the abstract:
Economic approaches to conflict tend to focus on its determinants, on the factors influencing its outcome, and on its consequence to the distribution of resources. Relatively little attention is paid to the ways these parties structure the internal organization of their efforts during conflict. This paper builds on the theory of contract choice to develop a framework for the analysis of military groups. This framework produces predictions on the systematic variation of military organization under different technological and environmental circumstances. These predictions are tested against historical evidence on a variety of historical case studies.
Walter E. Williams passed away in December, 2020. At the time of his passing, he was one of the clearest expositors of the property rights approach to economics, of whom Armen Alchian (Williams’ teacher) was one of the giants.
My reflections, from December, can be read at The American Spectator. Here’s an excerpt:
Thankfully for us, Williams didn’t nurse the grievances he’d endured at the hands of racist Army officers; instead, they were a source of curiosity to him. He became a fervent disciple of Armen Alchian’s distinct “UCLA” approach to microeconomic theory. The UCLA approach pursues “opportunity-cost” reasoning unflinchingly, all while emphasizing that opportunity costs vary with the property rights arrangement. For Williams, this meant asking questions like: “Why could I experience such vicious discrimination in the military, all while African Americans have begun to dominate the NBA?” Williams found the answer at UCLA: The opportunity cost of acting like a bigot is lower for the military man than the owner of a professional sports franchise. The latter will see his income fall if he indulges his bigoted tastes by passing over the best ball players merely to avoid association with African Americans. The military man’s income is secure regardless of his prejudicial behavior. One man can discriminate with virtual impunity; the other must forgo profits to exercise his bigotry.
Williams taught me and my classmates that “discrimination” is merely a synonym for “choice.” Each of us discriminates when we choose a college, a spouse, a church, and so on. So, the question arises: What are the conditions that allow space for racially discriminatory actions to breathe? In books such as his classics The State Against Blacks, South Africa’s War Against Capitalism, and Race and Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination?, Williams incisively demonstrated the role that public policies play in lowering the costs of racially discriminatory behavior. Reading Williams’ airtight logic, grounded in his UCLA price theory days, is a devastating blow to all who reason that union activity, minimum wages, or anti-discrimination laws are a boon to the disenfranchised.
Ennio’s reflections are here:
“The best thing I can ever say about Professor Williams is that he was a master at making me feel just ‘dumb’ and ‘ignorant’ enough to motivate me to study hard. Walking home from campus on late Tuesday nights after his graduate micro class, I often second-guessed my decision to get a PhD in economics. This was the result of the mild humiliation to which I subjected myself every week by attempting (and failing) to answer the questions he asked during class. How could I ever get my PhD in economics if I couldn’t even answer right just one of his questions?
The last day of classes, Professor Williams began testing our understanding of the material one last time. This edition of the show had a biblical theme. He went through a long list of peculiar obligations one finds in the Old Testament. I only remember two of them. The prohibition of wearing clothing made for the other gender and the rule that one could work his land with the aid of two oxen or two donkeys, but not one of each. He then asked us what economic notion may explain such rules. Without raising my hand, I blurted “price discrimination!” Professor Williams turned towards me for a second, smiled, and went back to his lecture. I was not sure my answer was right (when it came to his questions, no answer ever seemed to be) but I interpreted his smile as acknowledging that I had an economic thought. It was my first such thought. It was as if something had ‘clicked’ in my head and now I could just think like that, like an economist. That’s what Professor William taught me and generations of students before me, and for which I will be forever grateful.”